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I. INTRODUCTION
In a time of rapid and extreme healthcare change following the
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),1
the need to have a certain process and application governing

1.
(2010).

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
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healthcare mergers is of the utmost importance.2 The ACA has
imposed significant changes on consumers as well as healthcare
providers.3 Many providers and hospitals have started
consolidating their entities to comply with the ACA, streamline
care, and maintain profitability.4 In light of this increase in
healthcare mergers, antitrust laws governing healthcare mergers
should be reexamined and updated to reflect the current
healthcare economy, as well as Congress’ objective in passing such
legislation.5
Mergers, specifically healthcare mergers, can potentially
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act if the merger has future
anticompetitive effects.6 A merger may be enjoined under the
Clayton Act if the potential for anticompetitive effects is alleged,
even if actual anticompetitive facts are not proven.7 First, the
entity challenging the merger must show a prima facie Clayton Act
violation.8 The entity defending the merger then has to show that

2. Brief for Professors & Scholars of Law & Econ. & Int’l Center of Law & Econ. et.
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 4–5, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v.
St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 1:12-cv-00560- BLW, 1:13-cv00116-BLW) [hereinafter Brief for Professors].
3. Melinda K. Abrams et al., The Affordable Care Act’s Payment and Delivery
System Reforms: A Progress Report at Five Years, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 7, 2015),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/may/aca-payment-anddelivery-system-reforms-at-5-years.
4. Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation — Still More to Come?, 370 N.
ENGL. J. MED. 198, 198–99 (2014).
5.

See Brief for Professors, supra note 2, at 3–6.

6. David L. Glazer, Clayton Act Scrutiny of Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: The Wrong
Rx for Ailing Institutions, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1042 (1991) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)).
7.

Id.

8. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Lukes),
778 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Section 7 does not require proof that a merger or other
acquisition has caused higher prices in the affected market. All that is necessary is that the
merger create an appreciable danger of such consequences in the future.” (quoting Hosp. Corp.
of Am. v. F.T.C., 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir.1986))).
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the merger is not anticompetitive, despite the prima facie
showing.9 One way of doing this is to show merger-based
efficiencies.10
The efficiencies defense consists of both cost efficiencies, and
quality based efficiencies.11 Cost efficiencies look at the financial
savings that will result from combining entities, while quality
based efficiencies focus on the efficiencies that improve the quality
of the merged entity’s product or performance.12 The efficienciesbased defense is being applied inconsistently among the courts,
leading to inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes in healthcare
mergers relying on the efficiencies defense.13 Quality based
efficiencies are often not given significant, if any, weight in merger
analysis, which essentially disregards potential consumer benefits
resulting from mergers generating quality efficiencies.14
The inconsistent application of the efficiencies defense in
healthcare mergers between circuit courts, as well as the lack of
certainty from the Supreme Court, leaves healthcare entities with
uncertainty regarding the success or failure of mergers.15 This
results in increased litigation, and a disruption in patient care.16
Some circuits, such as the D.C., Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh, have
recognized the efficiencies defense as a viable method of defeating
an alleged Section 7 Clayton Act violation.17

9.
10.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
Id.

11. Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100
IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1975 (2015).
12.

Id.

13.

Id. at 1993.

14.

Brief for Professors, supra note 2, at 4.

15.

Id. at 8.

16.

Id.

17. See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C., 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); F.T.C. v.
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001); F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186
F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999); F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
Each of these circuits has recognized that the efficiencies defense is a defense that can be used
successfully in rebutting a prima facie showing under the Clayton Act.
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However, other circuits, like the Ninth Circuit in Saint
Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System,
Ltd. (St. Luke’s), have not clearly recognized the viability of
efficiencies defenses in healthcare mergers, leaving healthcare
entities who would rely on the defense in limbo as to whether or
not a merger will be successful.18 Additionally, the circuits give
uncertain and disproportional weight to cost based efficiencies and
often ignore or provide unpredictable weight to quality based
efficiencies.19
This article advocates that developing a certain and consistent
application of the efficiencies defense in healthcare mergers will
decrease litigation by providing a framework for healthcare
entities seeking to merge. Additionally, this article advocates that
giving increased weight to quality based efficiencies and ACA
compliance is the best way to achieve this consistency. Finally, this
article advocates that recognizing quality based efficiencies, and
giving them greater weight in a Section 7 Clayton Act merger
analysis, will bring antitrust law into accord with current
healthcare policy. Recognizing quality based efficiencies will also
improve the quality of healthcare delivery by acknowledging the
benefit to consumers that results from the streamlined, integrated
care that is achieved through healthcare mergers.
First, this article will seek to educate the reader on how the
ACA has changed healthcare delivery systems.20 This will examine
the goals of the ACA, as well as how the ACA has changed the
healthcare market for consumers and providers. This article will
then look at Section 7 of the Clayton Act,21 focusing specifically on

18.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 789 (9th Cir. 2015).

19. Id. at 788; ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at
720; Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1206.
20.

See infra Part II.

21.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).

582

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 53

how the efficiencies defense can be used to rebut a prima facie
showing of a Section 7 violation.22
Next, this article looks at the difference between cost based
and quality efficiencies, and how this distinction, as well as the
efficiencies defense in general, are being applied inconsistently in
merger cases in the courts.23 Then this article will discuss the St.
Luke’s case and how the Ninth Circuit’s decision in St. Luke’s leads
to greater inconsistency regarding the efficiencies defense.24
Lastly, this article will advocate that courts, in reviewing
healthcare mergers, should give greater weight to quality based
efficiencies, because this will improve patient outcomes and bring
antitrust law into accord with current healthcare policy.25
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUE
Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) in 2010.26 The goal of the ACA was to establish a system
of “quality, affordable healthcare for all Americans.”27 A main focus
of the ACA was to ensure the quality of healthcare, while also
bringing down the cost of healthcare, which would in turn provide
greater access to healthcare services.28 The ACA’s focus was on
improving patient outcomes, by linking payment of healthcare
services to quality outcomes and shifting towards a prospective
payment system rather than a retrospective payment system.29
The ACA created a wave of changes for healthcare entities,
including a change in fee structure and repayment, as well as

22.

See infra Part III.

23.

See infra Part IV & V.

24.

See infra Part VI.

25.

See infra Part VII.

26.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

(2010).
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various other requirements like electronic health records,
Medicare requirements, and reporting requirements.30
This drastic change to the healthcare delivery systems created
new issues for healthcare entities to solve in order to stay
competitive with prices and maintain their foothold in the
healthcare market.31 Many entities began looking to mergers as a
way to increase the efficiency of their healthcare delivery system,
and lower costs by combining services, such as electronic health
records.32 In turn, these mergers should mean a greater continuum
of care for the consumer, as well as lower costs generated by the
efficiencies of combining entities.33
However, even if healthcare entities are meeting the goals of
the ACA by merging, that does not mean they are in the clear.
Healthcare entity and hospital mergers are still subject to
antitrust law.34 As it is today, antitrust law does not make any
exceptions for healthcare entities seeking to comply with the
ACA.35 An illustration of this will be discussed in St. Luke’s, a case
where a hospital acquired a physician group in order to improve
patient outcomes.36 The decision in St. Luke’s was highly
anticipated as the case was the first challenge of a hospital and
physician group merger to proceed to trial.37

30.

Id.

31. Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Jen A. Maki, Hospital Realignment: Mergers Offer
Significant Patient and Community Benefits, CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE ECON. & POLICY 1 (Jan.
23,
2014),
http://www.fticonsulting.com/~/media/Files/us-files/insights/reports/hospitalrealignment-mergers-offer-significant-patient-and-community-benefits.pdf.
32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).

35.

Id.

36.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).

37. David Garcia, In Highly-Anticipated Decision, Ninth Circuit Affirms That
Hospital-Physician Group Merger in St. Luke’s Violated Section 7 And Casts Serious Doubt on
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The Ninth Circuit upheld the ruling that St. Luke’s must
divest itself from the physician group Saltzer.38 The most
significant aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was the holding that
casts doubt on when, if ever, a healthcare entity merger can rebut
a prima facie violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act through post
merger efficiencies.39 This is problematic because in a new era
where healthcare entities are compelled to comply with the ACA,
generating efficiencies may be the only way to meet these new
requirements and stay in compliance with the ACA.40
III. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
“[T]he primary goal of the antitrust laws is to improve
consumer welfare.”41 The Clayton Act was originally passed in
1914 and was amended to prohibit all mergers that may
substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.42
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was also amended to control for
monopolies and competitive restraints in areas of the market
where the Sherman Act fell short.43 The Clayton Act also differed
from the Sherman Act because the focus was potential
anticompetitive effects rather than a showing of an actual effect of
restraining trade.44 The Clayton Act is a broader provision, and
applies more readily to hospital mergers, and is thus the focus of
this article.

Viability of Efficiencies Defense, ANTITRUST LAW BLOG (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2015/02/articles/articles/in-highly-anticipated-decisionninth-circuit-affirms-that-hospital-physician-group-merger-in-st-lukes-violated-section-7and-casts-serious-doubt-on-viability-of-efficiencies-defense/.
38.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 793.

39.

Garcia, supra note 37.

40.

See generally Brief for Professors, supra note 2.

41.

Id. at 3.

42.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).

43.

Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766, 768

(1952).
44. Glazer, supra note 6, at 1042 (citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)). The law
review article discusses the two applications of antitrust law, both the Sherman Act, and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Department of
Justice, and private parties can seek to enforce Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.45 Recently, the FTC has become active in challenging
hospital mergers.46 With the passage of the ACA causing mergers
to become more common, the FTC began critically looking at
mergers, and successfully blocking them, or getting an order of
divestiture.47
In September of 2014, the New York Times published an
article stating that the FTC had recently been on a “winning
streak” by winning three litigated hospital merger cases in the last
two years.48 One in Albany, Georgia; one in Toledo, Ohio; and one
in Rockford, Illinois.49 Additionally, the article boasts of the FTC’s
first ever win of a case regarding a health system acquisition of a
health group – the St. Luke’s case.50 The FTC’s continued victories
over hospital merger cases caused the number of proposed mergers
to slow.51
With healthcare mergers becoming increasingly difficult to
achieve, healthcare systems and doctors were faced with having to
come up with other means to survive under the new impositions of
the ACA.52 One method for survival that evolved out of the need to

45. 15 U.S.C § 18; Fredric J. Entin et. al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an
Appropriate Antitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 111 (1994).
46. Dan Mulholland & Saheli Chakrabarty, The Effects of the Affordable Care Act
and Other Reform Efforts on Providers, Insurers and Patients-Consequences and Hidden Issues
of Health Reform, 85 PA. B.A. Q. 56, 59 (2014).
47.

Robert Pear, F.T.C. Wary of Mergers by Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2014, at

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

B1.
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rebut alleged anticompetitive effects resulting from mergers was
the increased reliance on the efficiencies defense.53
IV. THE EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE
“[A] primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their
potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the
merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result
in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new
products.”54 Prior to asserting an efficiencies defense, a plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case that a merger is
anticompetitive.55 Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie
showing of a Section 7 Clayton Act violation, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of anticompetitive
effects.56 The focus in St. Luke’s, as well as this article, is the
efficiencies defense.
A. Elements of the Efficiencies Defense
The entity or entities seeking the merger (usually the
defendant) carry the burden of showing that the alleged efficiencies
created by the merger are: (1) verifiable; (2) not attributable to
reduced output or quality; (3) merger specific; and (4) sufficient to
outweigh the transaction’s anticompetitive effects.57 The evidence
of the alleged efficiencies cannot be “mere speculation and
promises about post-merger behavior.”58 Additionally, the
defendant cannot overcome the illegality of the merger solely based
on “self-serving assertions.”59
In St. Luke’s, the Ninth Circuit stated that because of the high
market concentration in the Nampa, Idaho area, the merged entity
must show that the proposed merger would generate
53.

Blair & Sokol, supra note 12, at 1972.

54. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES].
55.

Olin Corp. v. F.T.C., 986 F.2d 1295, 1304–05 (9th Cir. 1993).

56.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015).

57.

See id.

58.

F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

59.

F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991).
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“extraordinary efficiencies” to rebut anticompetitive concerns.60
The court stated that though the merger would benefit patients,
St. Luke’s had not provided proof of efficiencies extraordinary
enough to rebut the prima facie case under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.61
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling directly reflects the current
dichotomy in healthcare mergers. Where some circuit courts are
willing to give weight to the pro-competitive effects of improving
healthcare delivery systems by recognizing post-merger
efficiencies,62 other circuit courts are not, and focus solely on cost
based projections. This uncertainty is leading to inconsistent and
unpredictable merger outcomes.63
B. Cost Based vs. Quality Efficiencies
There are both cost based and quality based efficiencies.64
Currently, in cases where health care entities use the efficiencies
defense, courts primarily look at cost based efficiencies and do not
consistently take into account quality based efficiencies.65 When
quality based efficiencies are considered, they are often given less
weight than the cost based efficiencies.66 This uncertain
application of the efficiencies defense has left health care entities

60.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3rd at 790 (emphasis added) (citing H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at

61.

Id.

720).

62. The D.C. Circuit, as well as the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all
recognized that an efficiencies defense may be able to rebut a prima facie showing under the
Clayton Act. The Eighth Circuit specifically noted the procompetitive effects of a merged
healthcare entity being able to increase the quality of care and attract quality specialists to
the hospital. See F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
63.

Id. (The circuit courts reach differing opinions regarding the efficiencies defense).

64.

Id.

65.

Blair & Sokol, supra note 11, at 1973–74.

66.

Id. at 1973–74.
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unable to know if, or how, to structure a merger as to avoid
violating antitrust law.67
This disparity between an increase in quality and a lack of
quality efficiency recognition was demonstrated in St. Luke’s. One
of the main arguments that St. Luke’s hospital made was the
increase in the quality of health care that would result from the
merging of St. Luke’s hospital with Saltzer Medical Group.68 This
would include a change in the fee system, a new electronic health
record system, and integrated care.69 The court stated that they
believed that health care would be improved for patients, but that
the efficiencies were not merger specific and dependent as to serve
as a quality based efficiencies defense.70
The lack of recognition and weight given to a quality based
efficiencies defense illustrates a divide between current antitrust
law and current health care policy. The ACA was enacted to
improve patient outcomes, reduce costs, increase quality, and
increase access to health care.71 However, current antitrust law
does not give due weight to these objectives, and focuses heavily on
cost based efficiencies, when recognizing efficiencies at all. This
results in uncertainty in healthcare entities’ ability to merge, when
they are merging to meet the demands placed upon them by the
ACA.
C. The Supreme Court’s Uncertain Ruling on the Efficiencies
Defense
The Supreme Court has not recognized the efficiencies defense
as sufficient to rebut a claim under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.72
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court cast doubt

67.

Id.

68.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 789 (9th Cir. 2015).

69.

See id.

70.

Id.

71.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119

72.

F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 597 (1967).

(2010).
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on whether or not the efficiencies defense should be recognized at
all.73
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain
operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is
not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small
independent stores may be adversely affected. It is
competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But
we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned business. Congress appreciated that occasional
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance
of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We
must give effect to that decision.74
Despite the Supreme Court’s uncertain ruling on whether or
not an efficiencies defense will allow a merger to be successful,
there is a trend among lower courts to recognize the existence of
the defense.75 However, even the circuit courts that recognize the
availability of the efficiencies defense have not been consistent in
upholding the defense such as to rebut a prima facie showing under
the Clayton Act.76 This has created uncertainty in the availability
and applicability of the efficiencies defense.
V. THE CIRCUITS’ TAKE ON THE EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE

73.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).

74.

Id.

75. See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C., 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); F.T.C. v.
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001); F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186
F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999); F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
Each of these circuits has recognized that the efficiencies defense is a defense that can be used
successfully in rebutting a prima facie showing under the Clayton Act. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d
775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015).
76. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720;
Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1206.
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Though the Supreme Court has not expressly recognized or
rejected the efficiencies defense, several circuit courts have
recognized that an efficiencies based defense may be successful in
rebutting a prima facie showing under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.77
A. D.C. Circuit
In FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., the D.C. Circuit recognized the
existence of the efficiencies defense, but failed to hold that the
defendants succeeded in rebutting the plaintiff’s prima facie case.78
The case involved a merger between the second and third largest
producers of baby food in the United States.79
In Heinz, the second and third largest manufacturers of jarred
baby food sought to merge.80 Prior to the merger, the baby food
market was dominated by three major players – Gerber, who had
a 65% market share; Heinz, which held a 17.4% market share; and
Beech-Nut, which held a 15.4% market share.81 Heinz and BeechNut agreed to a merger where Heinz would acquire 100 percent of
Beech-Nut’s voting securities.82 The FTC sought a preliminary
injunction which was denied by the district court.83 The district
court held that the merger would likely increase competition in the
jarred baby food market in the United States.84 FTC appealed,

77. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720;
Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1206. Though these
circuits have recognized the existence of the efficiencies defense, none of the circuits have
actually held that the efficiencies defense presented was successful in rebutting the alleged
anticompetitive effects. Even though the efficiencies defense has not yet been successful, the
circuit courts’ recognition of the efficiencies defense shows progress towards a system of
recognizing and giving due weight to the efficiencies defense.
78.

H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720–22.

79.

Id. at 711.

80.

Id. at 712.

81.

Id. at 711–12.

82.

Id. at 712.

83.

Id. at 713.

84. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 712, (citing Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 199
(D.D.C. 2000)).
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stating that the merger, if completed, would violate Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.85
The court stated that in order for the FTC to succeed on the
merits, it would need to show that the merger of Heinz and BeechNut would substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly, such to establish a prima facie showing under Section 7
of the Clayton Act.86 The FTC could do so by establishing that the
merged entity would result in an entity controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and would result in an
increase in the concentration of firms in that market.87 Thus, such
a showing establishes a presumption that the merger is
anticompetitive, and defendants must rebut such a presumption.88
The D.C. Circuit held that based on the market concentration
and the anticompetitive effects on wholesale competition, the FTC
established a prima facie case that the merger would be
anticompetitive,89 and that the defendants had failed to carry their
burden of rebutting the presumption.90
The defendants tried three defenses, including the defense of
post-merger efficiencies.91 The defendants alleged that the
efficiencies resulting from the merger would be used to compete
more effectively against the leading baby food manufacturer,
Gerber.92 The D.C. Circuit acknowledged the trend among lower

85.

Id.

86.

Id. at 714.

87.

Id. at 715.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 717–18.

90.

H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 718.

91.

Id. at 720.

92.

Id.
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courts to recognize the defense.93 The court went on to acknowledge
courts who have recognized the defense and the benefits of
recognizing such a defense, including the ability of the merged firm
to achieve lower costs than either firm could have achieved without
the merger.94
Despite the recognition of the efficiencies defense, the court
ultimately found that the efficiencies defense was not sufficient as
to rebut the prima facie case, citing that the high market
concentration level required proof of “extraordinary efficiencies”
which the defendants had failed to prove.95 The case was remanded
for entry of a preliminary injunction.96
B. Sixth Circuit
In ProMedica Health System, Inc. v. F.T.C., the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged that an efficiencies defense may be successful in
rebutting a Section 7 Clayton Act claim, however, the court did not
find such a defense in the case, because the efficiencies defense was
not asserted.97 In ProMedica Health, there was a proposed merger
between two of the four hospital systems in Lucas County, Ohio.98
One of the entities was the county’s dominant hospital provider,
and the other was an independent community hospital.99 The two
entities merged in 2010, leaving the combined entity with a large
percentage share of the relevant market.100 After an extensive
hearing, an administrative law judge and the Commission found
that the merger would be anticompetitive in violation of Section 7
and ordered the two entities to divest.101

93.

Id.

94. Id. (citing Efficiencies, U.S.
https://www.justice.gov/atr/4-efficiencies).

DEP’T

OF

JUSTICE

(June

25,

95.

Id.

96.

H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 727.

97.

ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C., 749 F.3d 559, 572 (6th Cir. 2014).

98.

Id. at 561–62.

99.

Id.

100.

Id. at 563.

101.

Id. at 564.
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The merged entity (ProMedica) petitioned for a review of the
order of divestiture.102 The Sixth Circuit Court found that the
plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case by
showing a Section 7 Clayton Act violation due to the
anticompetitive effects of the merger.103 Because a prima facie case
had been established, it was up to ProMedica to rebut the
presumption of anticompetitive effects.104
ProMedica asserted several defenses, however it did not assert
an efficiencies based defense.105 The court here noted that it was
“remarkable” that the defendants did not assert an efficiencies
defense.106 The court stated that parties seeking an efficiencies
defense often argue that the efficiencies enhance consumer welfare
by lowering prices.107 The court went on to talk about consumer
welfare, and the beneficial impact that merger generated
efficiencies can have on lowering prices, improving quality, and
enhancing services.108 In finding that the defendants failed to rebut
the presumption of a Clayton Act violation, the Sixth Circuit noted
the lack of an asserted efficiencies defense.109
C. Eighth Circuit
In F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., the Eighth Circuit found
that an efficiencies defense may be able to rebut a Section 7
claim.110 In Tenet Health Care Corp., two hospitals in southeastern
102.

Id.

103.

ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 561.

104.

Id. at 571.

105.

Id.

106.

Id.

107.

Id.

108.

Id.

109.

ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 572.

110.

F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999).

594

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 53

Missouri sought to merge, but the FTC sought and was granted a
preliminary injunction preventing them from doing so.111 The
merged entity appealed to the Eight Circuit.112
The Eighth Circuit noted that even if the district court rejected
Tenet’s efficiencies defense, those efficiencies should have been
considered in the context of the competitive effects of the merger.113
The court found that the increased efficiencies generated from
combining entities would result in better medical care.114
Additionally, the court noted that the increase in the quality
of medical care would help in attracting highly qualified providers
and specialists which could in turn increase competition through
integrated delivery and tertiary care.115 “In view of the significant
changes experienced by the hospital industry in the recent past
and the profound changes likely facing the industry in the near
future, . . . a merger, deemed anticompetitive today, could be
considered procompetitive tomorrow.”116
The Eighth Circuit noted that “the merged entity may well
enhance competition in the greater Southeast Missouri area.”117
The court reversed the district court’s enjoining of the merger, and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the opinion. 118
D. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit held that in certain circumstances,
showing significant efficiencies generated by a merger could rebut
the prima facie case of a Clayton Act violation.119 In F.T.C. v.

111.

Id.

112.

Id.

113.

Id. at 1054.

114.

Id.

115.

Id.

116. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1047 (citing United States v. Mercy Health
Servs., 107 F.3d 632, 636 (8th Cir. 1997)).
117.

Id. at 1055.

118.

Id.

119.

F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
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University Health, Inc., University Hospital wanted to acquire the
assets of St. Joseph Hospital, which was a nonprofit entity.120 The
FTC sought a preliminary injunction to prevent hospital operators
from acquiring the assets of another hospital, as the FTC alleged
that this would result in lessened competition.121 The district court
denied the preliminary injunction, and the FTC appealed.122
The Eleventh Circuit held that Section 7 of the Clayton Act
applied to asset acquisitions by non-profit hospitals, and that the
FTC had established a prima facie case that the hospital failed to
rebut with a showing of significant efficiencies.123 The hospital
argued that the acquisition would result in significant efficiencies,
so the merger would not substantially lessen competition.124 The
FTC responded by saying the law would not recognize the
efficiency defense in any form.125 The court held that “in certain
circumstances, a defendant may rebut the government’s prima
facie case with evidence showing that the intended merger would
create significant efficiencies in the relevant market.”126
The hospital went on to state that the merger would reduce
“unnecessary duplication” between the two entities and therefore
reduced costs.127 However, the court found that efficiencies claimed
had no proof of sustainability of benefit to consumers.128

120.

Id.

121.

Id. at 1206.

122.

Id.

123.

Id. at 1220.

124.

Id. at 1222.

125.

Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1222.

126.

Id.

127.

Id. at 1223.

128.

Id.
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Ultimately, the court held that “an efficiency defense . . . may
be used in certain cases to rebut the government’s prima facie
showing in a [S]ection 7 challenge . . .” but that the appellees could
not use the defense in the current case because they had failed to
demonstrate that their acquisition would produce significant
economies.129
E. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit in St. Luke’s departed somewhat from the
view of its sister circuits that had recognized the efficiencies
defense.130 While the court did briefly entertain the idea that the
efficiencies defense may exist, its analysis of the St. Luke’s case
made it clear that the court was skeptical of the defense, and the
success of the defense was unlikely.131
The court, in the beginning of the St. Luke’s opinion, notes that
“[t]he status of the defense in this circuit remains uncertain.”132
The Ninth Circuit went on to state “[w]e remain skeptical about
the efficiencies defense in general and about its scope in particular.
It is difficult enough in § 7 cases to predict whether a merger will
have future anticompetitive effects without also adding to the
judicial balance a prediction of future efficiencies.”133
The court noted that an entity could combine to form a more
efficient entity and therefore increase competition. “In other words,
a successful efficiencies defense requires proof that a merger is not,
despite the existence of a prima facie case, anticompetitive.”134
St. Luke's argues that the merger would benefit patients by
creating a team of employed physicians with access to Epic,
the electronic medical records system used by St. Luke's.
The district court found that, even if true, these predicted

129.

Id. at 1223–24.

130.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 789 (9th Cir. 2015).

131.

Id.

132.

Id. at 789.

133.

Id. at 790.

134.

Id.
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efficiencies were insufficient to carry St. Luke's' burden of
rebutting the prima facie case. We agree.
It is not enough to show that the merger would allow St.
Luke's to better serve patients. The Clayton Act focuses on
competition, and the claimed efficiencies therefore must
show that the prediction of anticompetitive effects from the
prima facie case is inaccurate.135
The court went on to echo the district court’s finding that the
merger would be beneficial to patient care, and would improve the
delivery of healthcare in the Nampa area.136 However, the court
ultimately found that the efficiencies generated were not merger
specific and did not increase competition.137 The court went on to
say that even if the efficiencies were merger specific, “[a]t most, the
district court concluded that St. Luke's might provide better
service to patients after the merger. That is a laudable goal,
but the Clayton Act does not excuse mergers that lessen
competition or create monopolies simply because the merged entity
can improve its operations.”138 St. Luke’s was ordered to divest
from Saltzer.139
The Ninth Circuit mentioned several times the beneficial
impact that the merger would have on patient care, and healthcare
delivery in Nampa Idaho.140 However, the court focused solely on
cost based projections in assessing St. Luke’s presentation of the
efficiencies defense.141 The court did not take into account the
quality based efficiencies, nor did it take into account the effects of
135.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791.

136.

Id.

137.

Id.

138.

Id. at 792.

139.

Id. at 793.

140.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 793.

141.

Id.
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the recently passed ACA on healthcare entities.142 This illustrates
the need for antitrust law to be updated and harmonized with the
healthcare market as it is in a post-ACA world. The St. Luke’s case
will be examined in greater detail below.
VI. ST. ALPHONSUS V. ST. LUKE’S: A BACKGROUND OF
THE CASE
As was briefly mentioned previously, the St. Luke’s case
involved a hospital acquisition of a physician group in Nampa,
Idaho and a Ninth Circuit ruling on the challenged merger.143
Nampa, Idaho is the second largest city in the state of Idaho, and
is located about twenty miles west of Boise.144 Prior to the merger
at issue, St. Luke’s Health Systems, Ltd. (St. Luke’s) was operating
as a non-profit health care system, with an emergency clinic in
Nampa.145 Saltzer Medical Group (Saltzer), “the largest
independent multi-specialty physician group in Idaho, had thirtyfour physicians practicing in Nampa.”146
At the time of the merger, the only hospital in Nampa was
operated by Saint Alphonsus Health System, Inc. (St.
Alphonsus).147 Saltzer was “the largest adult primary care
physician (PCP) provider in Nampa, with sixteen PCPs.”148 St.
Luke’s had eight PCPs and St. Alphonsus had nine PCPs.149
A. The Merger
Saltzer had wanted to integrate patient care and move
towards risk based reimbursement, and sought to merge with a

142.

Id.

143.

Id. at 789.

144.

Id. at 781.

145.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 781.

146.

Id.

147.

Id.

148.

Id.

149.

Id.
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large health care system.150 The physician group needed to upgrade
its medical record system to stay current with the industry, but
could not afford to do so on its own.151 Saltzer had previously tried
to merge with other entities, but was unsuccessful.152
In 2012, St. Luke’s purchased Saltzer’s assets and entered into
a five-year service agreement.153 The agreement stated that both
organizations
wanted
to
discontinue
fee-for-service
reimbursement.154 However, the agreement did not include any
provisions to implement that goal, but was revised to contain some
quality based incentives.155 The merger did not require Saltzer to
refer to St. Luke’s or to use St. Luke’s facilities.156
In March 2013, St. Alphonsus filed a complaint seeking to
enjoin the merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, citing
anticompetitive effects in the relevant market of Nampa.157 The
district court denied the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the
agreement between Saltzer and St. Luke’s did not require referrals
150.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 781.

151. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr. - Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St.
Luke’s District Court Decision), No. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *3 (D. Idaho
Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
152.

Id.

153.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 781.

154. Fee-for-service reimbursement is a payment system where healthcare providers
are paid for every service they perform, such as an office visit, a physical examination, or a
test.
Fee-for-Service,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/delivery-systems/feefor-service.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). The opposite of this is a prospective payment
system, where healthcare providers are paid a predetermined, fixed amount based on a
classification system. See Prospective Payment Systems - General Information, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-servicepayment/prospmedicarefeesvcpmtgen/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
155.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 782.

156.

Id.

157.

Id.
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to St. Luke’s; the agreement would take place over time; and the
agreement provided a process for unwinding if so ordered.158
Also in March of 2013, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and State of Idaho filed a complaint in district court “to enjoin the
merger pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),
the Clayton Act, and Idaho Law.”159 The complaint cited
anticompetitive effects in the PCP market in Nampa.160 This case
was consolidated with the case brought by St. Alphonsus.161
B. The District Court’s Determination
The Idaho district court held a nineteen-day bench trial.162 St.
Luke’s argument focused heavily on the efficiencies the merger
would create, and how those efficiencies would outweigh any
anticompetitive effects.163 The district court held that St. Luke’s
needed to provide convincing proof of merger specific efficiencies
that arose as a result of the merger, and were thus, merger
specific.164
The district court discussed the ever-changing United States
healthcare system, and found that St. Luke’s and Saltzer
genuinely wanted to improve patient outcomes through merging
the two entities.165 However, the court noted that the huge market
share the merged entity would occupy created a substantial risk of
anticompetitive price increases in the Nampa PCP market.166 The
court rejected St. Luke’s argument that the post-merger
158.

Id.

159.

Id.

160.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 782.

161.

Id.

162.

Id.

163.

St. Luke’s District Court Decision, WL 407446, at *23.

164. Id. Merger specific efficiencies are “efficiencies that cannot be achieved by either
company alone because, if they can, the merger’s asserted benefits can be achieved without
the concomitant loss of a competitor.” F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 722 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
165.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 782.

166.

Id.
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efficiencies outweighed potential price increases, and the court
ordered divestiture.167
After the district court ordered St. Luke’s and Saltzer to
divest, St. Luke’s appealed.168 The Ninth Circuit, in a highly
anticipated decision, ultimately upheld the district court’s
determination that St. Luke’s had to divest from Saltzer.169
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling
Prior to the decision in the St. Luke’s case, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the recognition of the efficiencies defense in a decision over
thirty years ago.170 The Ninth Circuit admitted that it remained
skeptical of the defense, noting difficulties in foreseeing the
outcome of the alleged efficiencies.171
In the present case, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs
had established a prima facie case of a Section 7 violation under
the Clayton Act.172 The court looked to the high market share, the
ability of St. Luke’s to charge hospital rates for ancillary services,
and the ability to negotiate higher primary care reimbursement
rates from insurers.173 “Because the plaintiffs established a prima
facie case, the burden shifted to St. Luke’s to” rebut the alleged

167. Id. Divestiture, as it is used here, means essentially to unwind, meaning St.
Luke’s would no longer possess Saltzer. Divestiture, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2016),
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/divestiture.
168.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 782.

169.

Id. at 793.

170. Id. at 789 (citing RSR Corp. v. F. T. C., 602 F.2d 1317, 1325 (9th Cir. 1979)). The
difference in that case, however, was that the argument put forth was that the efficiencies
would allow the defendant to compete outside the market, whereas more recent cases, as well
as St. Luke’s, are using the efficiencies defense to justify competing inside the market. Id.
171.

Id. at 790.

172. Id. at 786. A prima facie case is established if the plaintiff proves that the merger
will probably lead to anticompetitive effects in that market. Id. at 785.
173.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 786.
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anticompetitive effects.174 St. Luke’s relied heavily on its assertion
of the post-merger efficiencies that would be generated and the
procompetitive effects of those efficiencies.175 St. Luke’s also urged
that the merger would allow St. Luke’s to move toward integrated
care, and risk-based reimbursement.176
Ultimately, the claimed post-merger efficiencies by St. Luke’s
was not enough to carry the day, and the Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court’s order of divestiture.177 The Ninth Circuit began by
looking at the Supreme Court’s take on the efficiencies defense,
and pointed out that the Supreme Court has never expressly
recognized efficiencies as a defense to a Section 7 Clayton Action
violation.178 The Ninth Circuit also looked to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. where the Supreme Court
stated, “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to
illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen
competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance
in favor of protecting competition.”179
Though the Ninth Circuit read the Supreme Court’s ruling as
precluding an efficiencies defense, the court did acknowledge that
four other circuits (D.C., Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh) have
suggested that post-merger efficiencies can rebut a Clayton Act
Section 7 prima facie case.180 However, the court specifically noted
174.

Id. at 788.

175.

Id.

176.

Id.

177.

Id. at 785.

178.

Id. at 789 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962)).

179.

F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).

180. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789. The Ninth Circuit did go on to point out that though
the four circuits recognized the existence of a post-merger efficiencies defense to a prima face
showing under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, none of those circuits actually held that a
defendant succeeded in rebutting a Section 7 prima facie claim. Id. However, the Eighth
Circuit noted:
[A]lthough Tenet’s efficiencies defense may have been properly rejected by
the district court, the district court should nonetheless have considered
evidence of enhanced efficiency in the context of the competitive effects of
the merger. The evidence shows that a hospital that is larger and more
efficient than Lucy Lee or Doctors’ Regional will provide better medical
care than either of those hospitals could separately. The merged entity
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that even the circuits who have recognized the existence of the
efficiencies defense have not actually held that a defendant
succeeded in rebutting a Section 7 prima facie case.181 Therefore,
the court said, “thus, even in those circuits that recognize [the
defense], the parameters of the defense remain imprecise.182
The Ninth Circuit went on to say that the status of the defense
in the Ninth Circuit remained uncertain.183 The Ninth Circuit
stated their skepticism of the defense and its scope, but stated that
because Section 7 of the Clayton Act only prohibits mergers that
substantially lessen competition, a defendant could theoretically
rebut a prima facie case with evidence of a more efficient, combined
entity that increases competition.184 The court went on to say that
courts who have recognized the defense require the defendant to
clearly demonstrate that the merger would enhance rather than
hinder competition because of the increased efficiencies.185 The
court said that because Section 7 of the Clayton Act seeks to avert
monopolies, “extraordinary efficiencies” must be shown and the
efficiencies must be merger specific.186
St. Luke’s argued that the merger would benefit patients
through an integrated care system and the use of improved
electronic health care records.187 The Ninth Circuit held that even

will be able to attract more highly qualified physicians and specialists and
to offer integrated delivery and some tertiary care.
F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045,1054 (8th Cir. 1999).
181.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789.

182.

Id.

183.

Id.

184.

Id. at 790.

185. Id. (citing United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F.Supp. 121, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)).
186.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789.

187.

Id. at 791
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if true, the predicted efficiencies were insufficient to rebut the
prima facie case.188 The court held that “it is not enough to show
that the merger would allow St. Luke’s to better serve patients.
The Clayton Act focuses on competition, and the claimed
efficiencies therefore must show that the prediction of
anticompetitive effects from the prima facie case is inaccurate.”189
The court upheld the district court’s finding that the merger,
though likely to improve patient outcomes, would not increase
competition or decrease prices.190 The court also upheld the district
court’s finding that the efficiencies were not merger specific,
stating that there was no evidence St. Luke’s needed to merge to
integrate care.191 The court concluded the discussion of St. Luke’s
efficiencies defense by saying that even if the efficiencies were
merger specific, the defense would still fail because improving
operations does not allow an entity to lessen competition.192 The
court affirmed the district court’s order that St. Luke’s divest from
Saltzer.193
VII. ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LAW AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR SOLUTIONS
The analysis of this article will focus on antitrust law as it is
today, and the role that the efficiencies defense plays in healthcare
merger analysis under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The analysis
will also look at the implications and goals of the ACA, and how
the uncertain and inconsistent application of the efficiencies
defense is not improving consumer welfare, or bringing the
healthcare industry into accord with current healthcare policy. The
analysis will explain the benefits of making healthcare merger
review less stringent, namely by giving increased weight to quality
based efficiencies. Making it easier for healthcare mergers to
survive challenges is essential to moving towards integrated
healthcare, and compliance with the ACA.
A. Under Current Antitrust Law, When, if Ever, Can Post Merger
188.

Id.

189.

Id.

190.

Id.

191.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791.

192.

Id. at 791–92.

193.

Id. at 793.
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Efficiencies, That Allegedly Improve Patient Outcomes and
Enhance Competition, Succeed in Rebutting a Section 7 Clayton
Act Violation?
In the new post-ACA world, many healthcare entities,
providers, and hospitals are seeking to merge as a way to survive
under the new impositions of the ACA. The issue here is if a
hospital or healthcare entity that wants to merge can ever rely on
an argument of post-merger efficiencies to rebut a prima facie
showing of a Section 7 Clayton Act violation.
The Supreme Court, as noted earlier, has not specifically
recognized the viability of the efficiencies defense but has
acknowledged the trend among lower courts to recognize such a
defense.194 The Supreme Court’s lack of ruling on the issue, and the
indecision in application among the circuit courts, leaves
healthcare entities in antitrust limbo, unsure if a merger would be
successful or not.195 The trend among the circuit courts has been to
recognize the existence of the defense and its viability, though in
most cases the Court does not find the defense successful in
rebutting the prima facie case.196
Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance, there has been
a trend in the circuit courts and some district courts to recognize
an efficiencies defense as a viable option, though the courts have
still rarely, if ever, held that a defendant has succeeded in showing
efficiencies capable of rebutting the government’s prima facie

194.

F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 597 (1967).

195. See Glazer, supra note 6, at 1043 (noting the different approaches taken in two
circuit courts analyzing a Section 7 issue).
196. See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C., 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v.
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (2001); F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045,
1047 (8th Cir. 1999); F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1209 (11th Cir. 1991). Each of these
circuits has recognized that the efficiencies defense is a defense that can be used successfully
in rebutting a prima facie showing under the Clayton Act. However, the courts did not find
that the defense was successful in rebutting the plaintiff’s prima facie case.
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case.197 The idea, or illusion, of an efficiencies defense is almost
unattainable, as shown by the circuit courts.198 The courts are
willing to acknowledge that an efficiencies defense exists, but not
to apply the defense.
The Eighth Circuit, in F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., was
one circuit that was willing to recognize the defense as well as hold
that the defendants had successfully shown efficiencies that should
have been taken into account by the district court.199 The court, in
reaching its decision, focused on how improving medical facilities
and care would attract higher quality doctors, and in turn those
higher quality doctors would increase competition with
surrounding health care entities.200 This case seems to suggest that
it’s not just direct efficiencies that benefit the consumer that the
courts should be concerned with. Instead, the indirect benefits,
such as attracting higher quality providers that in turn increase
competition should also interest the courts.201
In applying this reasoning to the decision in St. Luke’s, it
seems that if the case had been decided in the Eighth Circuit,
versus the Ninth, the decision may have been in favor of the
merger. Since St. Luke’s would be providing integrated care, as
well as a broader scope of care to Saltzer patients that Saltzer could
not provide on their own, similar to the merger in F.T.C. v. Tenet
Health Care Corp, the decision may have gone the other way.202
The Eighth Circuit also considered as part of the efficiencies
defense, the fact that the merged entity would be able to provide
tertiary care, something that neither health care entity would be

197. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206.
198. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206. Even the circuits that
claim to recognize the defense have never actually held the defense successful in rebutting the
prima facie showing.
199.

Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1054.

200.

Id.

201.

Id.

202.

Id.
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able to provide on their own without the merger.203 The tertiary
care that was to be provided would be a direct result of, and
dependent upon, the two entities merging.204 This new merged
system would likely have resulted in an increased quality of care,
thus increasing competition through patient satisfaction.205 This
was a point argued in St. Luke’s, with the argument being made
that the merger would allow a team of St. Luke’s and Saltzer
physicians to have access to an electronic records system which
would result in a higher quality of integrated care.206 The court
expressly rejected this argument, noting that “It is not enough that
the merger would allow St. Luke’s to better serve patients.”207 The
court went on to write that the only concern is competition, and
that the efficiencies claimed needed to rebut the anticompetitive
effects of the merger.208
The circuit court’s rulings help to illustrate the divide and
uncertainty that exists in healthcare merger law as it is today. The
lack of consistent recognition of the efficiencies defense causes
confusion and inconsistency in healthcare mergers and does not
reflect current healthcare policy that seeks to improve patient
outcomes and integrate care.
B. What Does This Mean for Healthcare Entities Trying to Stay
in Compliance With the Affordable Care Act?
A healthcare entity seeking to merge in order to meet the
demands of the ACA needs to be wary of counting on the
efficiencies defense to uphold the merger.209 For an entity to
203.

Id.

204.

See Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1054.

205.

Id.

206.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015).

207.

Id.

208.

Id.

209. An entity seeking to merge should be wary of the efficiencies defense, due to its
uncertain application in district and circuit courts. See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C.,
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succeed using post-merger efficiencies defense, the efficiencies
need to be: (1) verifiable; (2) not attributable to reduced output or
quality; (3) merger specific; and (4) sufficient to outweigh the
transaction’s anticompetitive effects.210
What this actually means for entities varies depending on
what circuit they are in, as the application of the defense remains
uncertain.211 What is clear is that the efficiencies shown need to be
substantial and more than mere speculation or hopes for cost
savings.212 The efficiencies need to be specific in articulating to the
court exactly how, and why, the merger should be allowed to go
forward despite the prima facie case.213 The best example of this
was in F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., where the Eighth Circuit
found that an efficiencies defense may be able to rebut the prima
facie case because of the increased ability of the merged entity to
attract qualified providers, which would in turn enhance
competition.214 As noted above, several circuits have held that the
efficiencies defense could be able to rebut a prima facie showing of
the Clayton Act, whereas the Ninth Circuit has made it clear that
an efficiencies defense would be very difficult to successfully allege
and prove.215
Entities wanting to merge in order to comply with the ACA
need to be aware that the FTC is actively monitoring such
mergers.216 For an entity wanting to merge, there are other
defenses to a Clayton Act violation besides just efficiencies, and it

749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Tenet
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1047; F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
210.

H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 721.

211. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206.
212. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206.
213. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206.
214.

Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1054.

215. See St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Tenet Health Care Corp.,
186 F.3d at 1054.
216.

Pear, supra note 47.
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is possible that one of those defenses could allow the merger to
continue. However, should a party to a proposed merger seek to
hinge its defense on a claim of efficiencies, it needs to be prepared
for stringent testing and examining of the efficiencies claimed.217
Entities seeking to merge can of course seek other avenues to
achieve the goals of the merger without actually merging. This can
be difficult, as the entity that is seeking to merge has often
exhausted other options, or will be better served through a
merger.218
For consumers, the strict application of the efficiencies defense
has pros as well as cons. The main benefit to consumers is the strict
avoidance of healthcare monopolies being formed through
mergers.219 This can have a short-term benefit to consumers by
temporarily keeping costs down and forcing competition.220
However, as we move forward in a post-ACA world, the negative
implications from the strict application of the efficiencies defense
will outweigh the benefit of strictly avoiding anything resembling
a monopoly.
America is moving towards a healthcare model of integrated
care, with electronic health records and an ever increasing number
of specialists.221 What this means is that healthcare entities will
need to merge to provide integrated care and to keep costs down by
lowering the overhead associated with running multiple entities.
Allowing healthcare entities who have demonstrated cost-based
217. See generally St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775; ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J.
Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045; Univ. Health, Inc., 938
F.2d 1206.
218. In the St. Luke’s case, Saltzer needed the help of merging with a larger entity to
stay current with the ACA, and had already been unsuccessful in attempts at informal
affiliations. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 781.
219.

Id. at 789.

220.

Id. at 792.

221. Diana Culberston, AMA Update: Physician Practice Arrangements Trend Data,
AM.
HOSP.
ASS’N
RES.
CTR.
BLOG
(July
9,
2015),
https://aharesourcecenter.wordpress.com/tag/physician-employment/.
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and quality-based efficiencies to merge can help integrate
healthcare, and move towards improving patient outcomes.
C. Current Antitrust Law is Inconsistent with Healthcare Policy
While the passage of the ACA was a controversial issue, the
main goal of the legislature in passing the ACA was simple: get all
Americans access to the healthcare they need, and improve the
quality of the healthcare Americans receive.222 Antitrust law, as it
is today, is a barrier to achieving these goals.
The way that the legislature chose to achieve its goal of
improving healthcare was to pass a law that put new burdens on
consumers as well as on healthcare entities and providers.223
Consumers would be required to obtain health care coverage,
whereas providers would be held to a host of new requirements.224
Healthcare entities were to improve patients’ outcomes through
quality reporting methods, changing fee structure, and increasing
provider accountability.225
The healthcare industry was understaffed and overworked
before the passage of the ACA, with there already being a shortage
of healthcare workers.226 As a wave of newly insured patients
began seeking healthcare, entities and providers began to feel the
practical and economic pressures from the new requirements of the
ACA.227
Of course, doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals
want to help people in need, but the sheer logistics of
expanded care delivery, the current and growing shortage
of personnel, and limited resources will certainly undercut
222. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119,
190 (2010).
223.

Id. at 243.

224.

Id. at 244.

225.

Id. at 135.

226. Amy Anderson, The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on the Health Care
Workforce,
THE
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
(Mar.
18,
2014),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/the-impact-of-the-affordable-care-act-onthe-health-care-workforce.
227.

Id.
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the good intentions of the policymakers who crafted the
national health law. In fact, the “transformational” changes
touted by the law’s champions will likely complicate and
negatively affect health care workers and their ability to
provide care. These changes will increase regulatory
burdens, increase already heavy workloads, reduce
payments, impose new penalties, and disregard personal
preferences and values. The increased stress will further
destabilize the health care industry.228
One of the ways healthcare entities sought to remedy this
situation was through healthcare mergers, which would allow for
a combined sharing of costs, the ability to afford specialized
medical equipment, as well as integrated care.229 The economic
pressures put forth by the ACA have increased the consolidation
rate of providers and entities.230 In 2014, 32.8% of physicians
worked directly for a hospital, an increase from 29% in 2012.231 The
trend shows physicians moving from owning their own practices to
working for, or merging with, hospitals.232 The consolidation trends
have caused consumers to fear monopolies that will raise prices.233
Hospitals, however, maintain that consolidation will control cost
and enhance quality, keeping healthcare entities in accord with the
ACA.234
Healthcare mergers allow providers and hospitals to stay
financially viable in a time of new regulation and restrictions

228.

Id.

229.

Id.

230.

Mulholland & Chakrabarty, supra note 46, at 59.

231.

Culbertson, supra note 221.

232.

Id.

233.

Mulholland & Chakrabarty, supra note 46, at 59.

234.

Id.
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brought about by the ACA.235 “Hospitals, individual physicians,
group practices, and other health care businesses are merging and
consolidating to remain strong in the marketplace. Mergers and
acquisitions reduce overhead costs for billing and claims while
spreading out the financial risk and increasing market share.”236
By creating a barrier to considering quality-enhancing
efficiencies associated with better care, the approach taken
by the [Ninth Circuit] will deter future provider
realignment and create a "chilling" effect on vital provider
integration and collaboration. If the Panel’s decision is
upheld, providers will be considerably less likely to engage
in realignment aimed at improving care and lowering longterm costs. As a result, both patients and payors will suffer
in the form of higher costs and lower quality of care. This
can’t be – and isn’t – the outcome to which appropriate
antitrust law and policy aspires.237
Of course, as these entities continue to merge, the concern of
healthcare monopolies is a legitimate possibility. The issue is not
that these entities should not be subjected to antitrust law,
specifically the Section 7 of the Clayton Act; the issue is that when
these merged entities are evaluated under the Clayton Act, the
efficiencies generated by the merger—both cost based, as well as
quality—are not given consistent, and deserving weight. The
stringent examination of these entities under current antitrust law
does not take into account the benefit that the merged entity can
provide to the consumer through increased efficiencies and better
quality care.
When the merged entity forms, the merged entity generates
efficiencies that come from consolidation.238 These efficiencies
result in cost savings that make the entity more competitive in
their market.239 The merged entity also may generate quality based
efficiencies that allow it to provide a better quality of product or
235.

Id.

236.

Anderson, supra note 226.

237.

Brief for Professors, supra note 2, at 19.

238.

Anderson, supra note 226.

239.

Id.

2017

ST. ALPHONSUS MEDICAL CENTER V. ST. LUKE’S
HEALTH SYSTEM: THE UNCERTAIN APPLICATION OF
THE EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE IS LEADING TO
UNPREDICTABLE OUTCOMES IN HEALTHCARE
MERGERS

613

care.240 These efficiencies, both cost based and quality based, can
benefit consumers as well as increase competition through better
prices and a better quality of care.241 However, because the
Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on the efficiencies defense,
the defense is being applied inconsistently among lower courts.
This leaves entities whose merger rests on the efficiencies defense,
unsure of what the outcome will be if their merger is challenged.242
D. The Solution: Healthcare Entities Merger Specific Quality
Efficiencies Should be Given More Weight in Determining
Procompetitive Effects of the Merger
Enhancing consumer welfare is one of the main purposes of
the Clayton Act.243 Consumer welfare includes more than just cost
considerations; it also includes well-being and access to quality
healthcare.244 “Antitrust merger enforcement turns on predictions
of likely competitive effects. The government must demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects and that these
effects are not outweighed by likely consumer benefits.”245 “[T]he
primary goal of the antitrust laws is to improve consumer welfare.
The efficiencies defense has arisen as a key tool in modern

240.

See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

241.

FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999).

242. See generally St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015); ProMedica Health Sys.
v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet Health Care Corp.,
186 F.3d 1045; FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
243. See generally St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015); ProMedica Health
Sys., 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet Health Care Corp.,
186 F.3d 1045; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
244. See generally St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015); ProMedica Health
Sys., 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet Health Care Corp.,
186 F.3d 1045; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
245. Brief for Amici Curiae Int’l Center of Law and Econ. and Medicaid Defense Fund
in Support of Defendants-Appellants Urging Reversal at 6, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa
Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (Nos. 1:12-cv-00560- BLW, 1:13-cv-00116BLW) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae].
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antitrust law to ensure that over-enforcement does not preclude
arrangements that enhance consumer welfare.”246
Healthcare entities, in light of the ACA, merge in order to
combine overhead costs, streamline care, and integrate healthcare
delivery. “Integration, including hospital systems acquiring
general and specialized practice systems, provides the most cost
effective and efficient way for providers to align incentives, share
information, adopt higher value programs, and increase
investments in patient-oriented care.”247 Healthcare mergers can
benefit consumers by keeping costs lower through combining
entities, as well as streamlining and integrating care.248
Integration is crucial to bending the cost curve and
improving overall healthcare delivery. Healthcare policies
and recently enacted laws [the ACA] have begun to bring
about a transformational change in healthcare: the decline
of a volume-based, fee-for-service approach in favor of a
value-based, patient-oriented one. This approach
encourages delivery system reform and integration of care
in a number of ways including formation of accountable care
organizations, bundled payments, reduced hospital
payments for readmissions, and valued-based payment
systems in Medicare and Medicaid.249
In light of the numerous benefits to consumer welfare that are
achieved through healthcare mergers, the courts, when reviewing
challenged healthcare mergers, should be more stringent in
finding that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing a prima
facie case showing anticompetitive effects from the merger.250 A
stringent review of the plaintiff’s prima facie showing of alleged
anticompetitive effects will help to safeguard mergers whose

246.

Brief for Professors, supra note 2, at 3–4.

247.

Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 245, at 8.

248.

Id.

249.

Id. at 9–10.

250. For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, one needs only to show the potential
that the merger may lessen competition, a plaintiff does not have to show that the merger
actually is anticompetitive. Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986); 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
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alleged anticompetitive effects are minimal in comparison to the
benefits the merger will provide to consumers.
However, if a prima facie case is established, the courts should
then give greater weight to the merged entities’ use of an
efficiencies based defense, specifically quality based efficiencies.251
“A primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to
generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged
firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower
prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”252 The
merger guidelines state that improved quality and enhanced
service are primary benefits of efficiencies generated by healthcare
mergers.253 Therefore, to be in accord with antitrust law, as well as
sound policy, it is imperative that quality improvements, and
enhanced service, are taken into account when reviewing a merged
entity’s efficiencies.
Merged healthcare entities often generate procompetitive
efficiencies via quality efficiencies, through offering integrated
care, tertiary care, more services, and better specialists.254 These
quality measures allow the merged entity to better compete in the
marketplace, and therefore may rebut alleged anticompetitive
effects.255
[The Ninth Circuit’s] decision will signal to market
participants that the efficiencies defense is essentially
unavailable in the Ninth Circuit, especially if those
efficiencies go towards improving quality. Companies
contemplating a merger designed to make each party more

251. Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the defendant
to rebut the alleged anticompetitive effects. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 788.
252. Brief for Professors, supra note 2, at 4 (citing 2010 Merger Guidelines § 10
(emphasis added)).
253.

Id.

254.

FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999).

255.

Id.
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efficient will be unable to rely on an efficiencies defense and
will therefore abandon transactions that promote consumer
welfare lest they fall victim to the sort of reasoning
employed by the panel in this case.256
Providing a consistent and predictable framework for
healthcare mergers will allow entities seeking to merge the ability
to predict the success of their merger, and will therefore decrease
needless litigation and confusion.257 Additionally, as it is now,
mergers that benefit consumer welfare may often not be
undertaken, due to the uncertainty regarding potential challenges
to the merger.258 Adopting a framework that is 1) certain and
predictable in its application, and 2) in favor of advancing
beneficial healthcare mergers, will benefit consumers by
promoting consolidations that increase healthcare integration and
decrease costs.259
To achieve the benefits of integrated healthcare, and still
remain cognizant of antitrust concerns, this article suggests the
following approach to determine whether or not a merged entity
should be ordered to divest. When a healthcare merger is
challenged, the reviewing court should balance the alleged
anticompetitive effects of the merger with the benefits the merger
will provide, giving increased weight to improved consumer
welfare and quality based efficiencies. The reviewing court should
consider the potential benefit to consumers. This will include
decreased overall costs, increased access to healthcare providers
and specialists, an increase in integrated care, and increased
compliance with the ACA.260 The reviewing court will also look at
the potential detriment to consumers, focusing on an increase in
pricing power without the benefits mentioned previously. If the
256.

Brief for Professors, supra note 2, at 2.

257. Id. at 3–4 (noting that as it is now, beneficial mergers are not being effectuated
due to the uncertainty of the success of the merger.)
258.

Id.

259.

Id.

260. Compliance with the ACA, as it is used here, refers to complying with and
furthering the goals of the ACA. This includes shifting away from a fee-for-service payment
system to a value based, or prospective payment system. Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). This also includes establishing an
electronic records system; integrating care; improved patient access; and an increased quality
of care. Id. All of these benefits would have been achieved in the St. Luke’s/Saltzer merger. St.
Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015).
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benefits to consumers outweigh the potential detriments, the
merger should be upheld. This approach does not greatly depart
from antitrust law as it is today. The main difference is that this
approach takes into account all benefits to consumers, including
an increased quality of healthcare.
The dangerous healthcare monopolies that threaten consumer
welfare will still be kept at bay through this new system of
analysis, but entities who will benefit consumers through
integrated care and improved healthcare delivery, should have
their cost and quality-based efficiencies recognized as beneficial to
consumers.
Hospital mergers offer substantial benefits for patients and
communities. . . . All too frequently, conventional wisdom
suggested by media coverage is that hospital realignment,
mergers and consolidations systematically result in pricing
power, with anticompetitively higher prices for those
needing care. Yet, in terms of prices for consumers, this
study’s extensive review of the literature finds no consistent
statistical relationship between consolidation patterns and
hospital prices across the studies.261
Currently, the efficiencies defense, both cost based and quality
based, is often given little weight and an inconsistent application
in antitrust analysis by the courts. This leads to unpredictability
in healthcare mergers, and serves as a barrier to bringing the
healthcare industry into accord with healthcare policy, namely the
ACA. Revising the way that the efficiencies defense is analyzed in
healthcare merger cases, as well as giving increased consideration
to consumer welfare, will help to bring antitrust law into accord
with current healthcare policy, and will serve consumers by
recognizing the benefits derived from a system with integrated
care.

261. Guerin-Calvert & Maki, supra note 31, at 1 (a study finding that there is benefit
to healthcare mergers, including enhanced access, higher value, and greater efficiency).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The passage of the ACA brought about radical changes
impacting how consumers purchase healthcare, as well as how
healthcare is delivered to consumers.262 These changes in the
healthcare industry require that a new approach to healthcare
mergers be developed in order to move towards a better system of
healthcare in America. Reexamining how healthcare mergers will
be assessed will bring antitrust law into accord with current
healthcare policy, as well as benefit consumers through a
healthcare model that focuses on integrated care and streamlined
services.
Some circuits have recognized the efficiencies defense,
whereas others have cast doubt on whether or not the efficiencies
defense exists, or is a viable defense.263 This inconsistency
increases litigation regarding healthcare mergers, and does not
serve to improve patient care.
The Ninth Circuit, as evidenced by St. Luke’s, made it clear
that post-merger efficiencies must be significant and not merely
benefitting the merged entity with some trickle-down benefit to the
consumer.264 More appropriately, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning
was in accord with healthcare policy, recognizing an efficiencies
defense by the ability to attract better doctors and provide better
care.265 The Supreme Court could resolve these inconsistencies and
provide guidance to healthcare entities by developing a framework
for the efficiencies defense that would establish whether or not the
defense exists, and if it does, what exactly should be shown in order
to succeed.
The new analysis of healthcare mergers should give greater
consideration to the efficiencies defense, specifically focusing on
quality based efficiencies as well as cost based efficiencies. This
shift in focus will help improve healthcare and bring antitrust law
262.

Anderson, supra note 226.

263. See generally St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775; ProMedica Health Sys. v. FTC, 749 F.3d
559 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Tenet
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206
(11th Cir. 1991).
264.

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791.

265.

Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1054.
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into accord with healthcare policy by recognizing the shift in
healthcare delivery to a prospective system, that focuses on
improved patient outcomes and integrated care.
In conclusion, a certain and predictable application of
efficiencies defenses by courts, is necessary in order to move
towards a prospective health care system with integrated care. As
it is now, courts are divided on what is sufficient in establishing an
efficiencies defense, leaving entities that seek to merge without
guidance.266 The lack of certainty in healthcare mergers causes
confusion and increases litigation. Reexamining the antitrust
analysis of healthcare mergers in light of the ACA will improve all
aspects of healthcare in America, including consumer welfare. In a
world with a changing health care system, merging entities can
improve patient outcomes through cost savings and integrated
care, and therefore, should be allowed a less stringent efficiencies
examination.

266. See generally St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775; ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J.
Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045; Univ. Health, Inc., 938
F.2d 1206.

